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One of the most interesting lines of practice of a lawyer is
that of receiverships. They differ very materially from insol-
vency proceedings; the matters involved are, as a rule, large, as
courts will not appoint receivers where the amount involved is
trivial, and the discretion and authority conferred upon a
receiver who is, in fact as well as theory, the arm of the court,
is generally so ample that he is not hampered in his manage-
ment by the fixed and unchangeable rules which restrain a
trustee. The method of attacking a receiver's administration
of an estate is so much more formal than that of attacking a
trustee's administration, that there is always warning of
approaching difficulty, and generally, if the matter cannot be
satisfactorily adjusted for the interests of all concerned, between
the parties, a creditors' meeting will arrange it without undue
publicity. In the Probate Court, due to its informalities, often
the first information that counsel has of impending trouble is
when he receives notice from the judge to appear and be heard,
when all the secret history and troubles of the insolvent and the
practical difficulties of disposing of his estate satisfactorily, are
likely to be aired to the public, through the press, generally to
the great detriment of the property to be administered upon,
and the ultimate loss of the creditors. The undue haste made
necessary by our statutes in the settlement of insolvent estates,
does not exist in receiverships; and this frequently allows a
reorganization of the property, which otherwise would have
been needlessly sacrificed at a forced sale.
The practical importance of having the wisdom of successful
men of large experience, like the judges of our higher courts,
pass on disputed or contested questions that may arise in the
settlement of a concern's affairs, always commends itself to a
client. The power, however, to continue the business, which
the court frequently confers upon a receiver is the great reason
of his superior usefulness.
Receiverships are of great variety, but those simply to col-
lect rents under a foreclosure or to hold possession or administer
property pending litigation, are so small in importance as com-
pared with the class of receiverships which involve the settle-
ment of properties, that they can be passed over without notice.
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As receivers are only appointed by courts having equitable
jurisdiction it is always necessary, in the absence of statutes, to
allege facts in the complaint which entitle the court to take
cognizance of them as a court of equity. Statutes, however,
enlarging the jurisdiction of courts of equity in this respect, are
very common. In the absence of a statute a simple creditor of
a corporation must show that he has a valid claim against the
corporation and that he has exhausted his legal remedies before
he can secure the appointment of a receiver, and he must show
further that there are assets applicable to the payment of his
claim that are liable to be wasted, and that the circumstances
are such that to deny the application would entail loss upon
him. To show the difficulty of a creditor in securing a receiver
for a corporation, it is only necessary to refer to the following
cases, which are extremely interesting, as showing the powers of
a court of equity in this respect:
Falmouth National Bank v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., 166
Mass 550; Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., i5o U. S. 371.
This last case also holds that even the statute of a State
authorizing a creditor to obtain a receiver for a corporation in
State courts, would not be recognized in the Federal courts, the
case holding that "the line of demarcation between equitable
and legal remedies in the Federal courts cannot be obliterated
by State legislation."
Usually a receivership is brought about by the action of the
insolvent corporation itself, rather than by a suit at the instance
of a creditor, stockholder, or bondholder, although in such cases
it almost invariably takes the form of a friendly suit, wherein
the corporation accepts service of the papers, consents that the
same may be entered on the docket of the court immediately,
and that the prayer of the papers for a receiver may forthwith
be granted. Of course there is always some trouble which pre-
cipitates a receivership, like a threatened attachment, or a large
amount of indebtedness about to become due, or something of
that nature, by which it is rendered necessary-for the preserva-
tion of the business or property and the equal protection of all
interests -that it should be placed in the hands of the court. It
is infrequent, as a rule, that trouble actually occurs before the
receiver is appointed, and this is especially the rule, as no
attachment or lien is set aside by a receivership, as the receiver
takes the property as he finds it unless there is a special statute
providing for this contingency. In many States, including our
own-Connecticut-there is such a special statute: these
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statutes were designed to remedy the great injustice that fre-
quently occurred from an attachment being placed -on the
property just prior to the receivership, which, from the necessi-
ties of the situation, had to be satisfied in full. In such cases
the only remedy for an outside creditor was to bring insolvency
proceedings to set aside the attachment in States where the
bringing of such proceedings has this effect, as it has in many
of the States. Even now, in this State, our statute just men-
tioned is defectively drawn, so that a preference made just be-
fore the receivership is still valid, and it is necessary in order to
fully protect creditors to frequently resort to insolvency pro-
ceedings in addition to the receivership in order to set aside
preferences to favored creditors. The reason for the great
haste generally shown in the appointment of the receiver has,
with the enactment of these statutes, passed away, except in
cases where the property is situated in several States.
Formerly receivers were almost universally appointed in
chambers, at all times of the day and night, and a receiver once
so appointed was rarely disturbed or removed except for cause.
This last statement is true to a large extent now, but a change
seems to be occurring in this respect, in this jurisdiction, and
now judges very frequently appoint a temporary receiver with a
comparatively small bond and fix a day for the appointment of a
permanent receiver and order notice of it to be forthwith given
to all parties in interest; and this practice, when followed, does
not put upon objecting creditors who desird the appointment of
another person than the nominee of the corporation, for
receiver, the burden of showing that the first incumbent is
incompetent or undesirable, thus greatly lightening the burdens
of the objecting creditors. However, it is a matter of justice to
an insolvent concern, in many cases where its affairs have been
honestly managed, that the old management should not be
entirely ignored in the receivership, and as a rule judges and
courts are inclined to look with favor upon the employment of
those connected with the business to continue it, and frequently
the receiver himself is from the old management.. When this is
purposed, however, it is safer, if trouble is anticipated, to have
some one from an ouside business, who is a creditor, with him,
as a co-receiver, who represents the creditors, and who by his
presence as co-receiver will assure to them a speedy settlement
of the concern's affairs, and also will guard against the mistakes
which may have been the cause of the troubles of the old con-
cern. Again, if a re-organization is undertaken, it is frequently
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very embarrassing to have a member of the old corporation as
sole receiver. As a rule, trustees in insolvency have no greater
authority than to complete existing contracts and work up
materials on hand, while a receiver under authority of the
court may carry on the business and, if the creditors are will-
ing, sometimes the existence of a receivership may be prolonged
over many years, the receiver conducting the business the same
as the corporation itself would have done. Some judges are
extremely strict on this point, and desire in every way that
they can to shorten the lives of receiverships, while- other judges
are very liberal and pay little attention to the matter.
As a matter of justice to private enterprises of a similar
nature in the community, it would seem as though they should
be saved as much as possible from the unfair and irresponsible
competition of business concerns under a receivership, conduct-
ing a business for years, for receivers as a rule dispose of what
they have on hand below actual cost. It makes but little differ-
ence when they do business, whether they do it at a large profit
or at about cost, for if they need money, by applying to the
court they may issue receiver's certificates and so use up in
competition, which ordinary business men cannot meet, the
assets of the receivership. Private concerns, for self-protection
from this competition, which destroys profits and living expenses,
are frequently forced to buy the assets of the receivership.
Where a receiver has no ready money in his hands to conduct
the business of the receivership, it is often necessary, if he pro-
poses to carry it on, to raise sufficient money to do so. As a
rule the receiver of a manufacturing concern can secure all the
credit he needs simply by ordering goods, but receivers of
very large corporations, or railroads, almost invariably have to
raise ready money, and this is done by issuing receiver's certifi-
cates to an amount and in sums as authorized by the court.
There is no difficulty where a concern has large assets, in dis-
posing of these certificates, or promissory notes, of the receiver,
to banks and individuals. These receiver's certificates, it is
needless to say, are a first lien upon the property as it comes
into the hands of the receiver, and if the property is unincum-
bered they are really a first mortgage on all the assets, both
real and personal.
The power of the receiver to incur obligations for supplies,
materials, etc., is incidental to the power granted to continue
the business (Cake v. Mohun, 164 U. S. 311). In this way it
sometimes happens that great inroads are made upon the assets
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of a receivership, even when no power is granted by the court
to issue receiver's certificates.
A receivership does not extinguish the corporate life of a
corporation, it merely suspends it. Quite frequently the dissolu-
tion of the corporation is asked for and is granted in the judg-
ment. However, in any case the corporate life is so far sus-
pended that it is not necessary for the officers of the corporation
in a receiver's hands to make annual returns as required by
statute.
The court so far protects a receiver in the performance of
his duty that it is contempt of court on the part of anyone to sue
him, or to make him a defendant in a suit at law, or to in any
way interfere with the business of his receivership, unless special
permission from the court has first been obtained. Courts are
extremely jealous of their receivers in this respect; so jealous
that all it is generally necessary to do is to call the attention of
opposing counsel to the fact that he is in contempt, and it is very
seldom that the attempted interference with a receiver's powers
is actually brought to the attention of the court.
It is necessary for a receiver to secure special permission
before he brings a suit, or even employs counsel; but in practice
all these matters regarding the powers of the receiver are pro-
vided for in the order appointing him.
An interesting question in receiverships is that of the taxa-
tion of the property. In theory it would seem as though prop-
erty vested in a receiver should not be taxed and this seems to
be the better doctrine. However, that the property should pay
taxes somewhere is manifest equity. In theory, property in
the hands of a receiver ultimately belongs to the creditors, or
stockholders, or members of the corporation, or partnership, in
the receiver's hands, as the case may be, but the difficulty in
reaching property so'situated, for taxation, has led to the almost
universal practice of taxing property in the hands of the
receiver, and of his applying to the court for permission to pay
them; but the receiver has no power, without special permis-
sion, to pay taxes, and he will be protected by the court from
the tax collector, if need be. Questions concerning taxes
seldom arise where the estate is more than sufficient to pay the
expenses of the receivership, as the practice is as above indi-
cated, in this jurisdiction. The case of Brooks v. Town of
Hartford, 61 Conn. 124, bearing upon this subject, is a very in-
teresting one. The practical difficulties of the situation and the
manifest equities in favor of charging the property in the hands
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of a receiver with its just burden of taxation, have perhaps thus
far prevented a decision squarely on this point, although this
case would seem to indicate that if this question was squarely
presented to our highest court for decision it would be settled
that property in the hands of a receiver would not be subject to
taxation.
The most troublesome question in the management of re-
ceiverships is the extraterritorial authority of the receiver. A
receiver appointed in one State has no authority outside the
jurisdiction of the State that appoints him, save by the courtesy
or comity of the other States, and this courtesy or comity is not
always extended, although in recent opinions the authority of
receivers in other States has been quite generally recognized,
where it does not interfere with existing rights of its own citi-
zens; the tendency is decidedly towards giving foreign receivers
greater authority.
The general rule seems to be, as to property belonging to the
estate, but situated outside the limits of the jurisdiction
appointing the receiver, that the attaching creditor will hold the
property, if the attachment, or lien, or other method of security,
was obtained before the receiver actually took possession. If
the receiver actually takes possession of property belonging to
the estate before the attachment is made, he holds the property.
In this State there is a very interesting coterie of cases treating
of the powers of receivers and trustees in insolvency in this
-respect-.Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196; Pond v. Cooke, 4 Conn.
126; Blake Crusher Co. v. New Haven, 46 Conn. 473; Cooke v.
Orange, 48 Conn. 401.
As to the receiver's title to accounts outside the State, of
course the rule as to the location of personal property is well
known, but very frequently under the laws that exist in various
jurisdictions, it is a race between the creditors outside the juris-
diction of the court appointing the receiver, and the receiver, to
secure possession of accounts belonging to the receiver's estate,
owing by persons or corporations outside the State. The laws
of the several States are singularly defective in this respect, and
great injustice is often done, certain creditors practically secur-
ing their claims in full while others share only in the very
meagre dividend which the estate may yield. The inequities
of the situation should be remedied in some way by uniform leg-
islation throughout the several States. The receiver's title and
the recognition of that title is manifestly limited to the jurisdic-
tion of the court that appoints him, but this can be overcome in
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a measure, by having the corporation or partnership passing
into the hands of the receiver make a common-law assignment
of all book accounts and credits to the receiver, and then by the
use of the telegraph or telephone, giving notice to all the credi-
tors outside the State that the claim has been assigned to the
receiver, following the messages with the usual notices of
assignment, in writing. A common-law assignment is recog-
nized as transferring the title, everywhere, no matter in what
jurisdiction it is made.
Egbert v. Baker, 58 Conn. 319; First National Bank of
Rockville v. Walker, 6x Conn. 154.
The law in regard to the necessity of notice of the assignment
differs in different States, some holding that notice is necessary
and others that it is not necessary. In Massachusetts no notice
is necessary; in Connecticut notice is necessary. On this sub-
ject of an assignment and its effect in another jurisdiction, the
case of Clark v. Connecticut Peat Co., 35 Conn. 303, is an espe-
cially interesting one.
There is another doctrine which is now just becoming gen-
erally understood and used, and which is of great benefit to
creditors in the equal distribution of the property in insolvency
proceedings or under a receivership, and that is the doctrine
which was first prominently brought to the notice of the profes-
sion in the case of Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107. This is
too short an article to discuss these interesting subjects at
length, but this doctrine is in substance that a court having
jurisdiction both of the estate to be settled, and of an attaching
creditor who claims under the laws of another State, to have an
attachment on property belonging to the estate, which was
secured prior to the actual insolvency or the receivership, but
with knowledge of such steps being taken, will, as " court of
equity, acting in personam, enjoin such a creditor so having
security from availing himself of the benefit of his security, as
against the receiver, and so secure the property for the benefit
of all the creditors. As good a statement of this principle of
law as can be found anywhere is contained in Cook on Stock-
holders, third edition, Section 867, and note on page 1425. The
case of Cole v. Cunningham concerned insolvency proceedings,
but the principles apply to receiverships as well, so the case has
become the leading one on this subject. The language of this
very learned opinion at once suggests, whether a court having
jurisdiction of a receivership, and a creditor without the State
with an attachment either obtained after the appointment of the
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receiver, or under the circumstances just mentioned, who pre-
sents his claim to the receiver for a dividend from the property,
would not, as court of equity, extend the doctrine of Cole v.
Cunningham, so as to compel him to relinquish his security for
the benefit of the receivership before allowing his claim for a
dividend. This question has now by inference been practically
decided in Reynolds v. Adden, 136 U. S. 348; this case holds
that a creditor not coming within the jurisdiction, of course
can take advantage of his attachment in another State as against
the receiver, but from reading the opinion, in which this ques-
tion is touched on, one forms the conclusion that it is not proba-
ble that any court would allow, when its attention is called to
the fact, a creditor outside its jurisdiction, to at the same time
take advantage of such an attachment, and also to take a
dividend from the estate. Because of the difficulty of reaching
a creditor outside the jurisdiction, it would seem as though
courts would, in the future, be frequently called upon to exer-
cise this power.
in connection with receiverships in different States some of
the nicest questions arise. Quite frequently, especially in the
courts of Massachusetts, it will be found that although receivers
are appointed simultaneously in several States, yet the courts
there insist upon a complete administration of the affairs of the
receivership in that State, down to and including the final divi-
dend, judgment, and order discharging the receiver, although it
may be really only an ancillary receivership. in New York
State, they are more liberal, and if it happenis that the estate is
partly in New York and partly in Connecticut, and the corpora-
tion is a Connecticut corporation, and all the claims are pre-
sented in Connecticut, an order can generally be secured for the
removal of the property in New York, after -it has been turned
into cash, into Connecticut, to be administered upon and divided
among the creditors in Connecticut. If all the creditors do not
present their claims in both jurisdictions the courts will, if it is
suggested to them, order an extension of time in which the
creditors are to present their claims, and that notice of it be given
to them, so that they will all share alike. As a rule, receiver-
ships in different jurisdictions have to go through their natural
course and creditors who fail to present claims in both jurisdic-
tions do not fare alike, but only receive a dividend in the juris-
diction where they presented their claims. It is to be hoped
that the American Bar Association will use its great influence to
secure a uniformity of practice throughout the States of the
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Union, regarding the winding up and settlement of properties
which have assets in more than one jurisdiction, so that there
may be but one receivership necessary, which is recognized as
binding in all the States. It will not only save to creditors the
large expense of separate receiverships in each jurisdiction, but
will at the same time be equitable in its practical workings in
securing an equal distribution of the assets of the receivership.
Samuel C. Aforehouse.
NEW HAVEN, April ist, 1898.
